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Introduction	
In	this	paper	I	speak	directly	to	the	subject	matter	of	this	conference:	to	its	theme	of	flourishing,	and	
to	the	subject	areas	of	systems	thinking	and	design	that	this	conference	series	as	a	whole	seeks	to	
bring	together.	
The	conference	theme	of	flourishing	is	a	direct	reference	to	ethics,	and	in	particular	the	
Nicomachean	Ethics	of	Aristotle.	There	has	been	a	revival	of	interest	in	this	in	recent	decades	under	
the	heading	of	virtue	ethics.	Aristotle	defined	the	good	as	that	at	which	all	things	aim,	and	so	in	
terms	of	goals	and	purpose.	He	described	the	goal	of	human	life	in	terms	eudemonia,	which	is	usually	
translated	as	either	human	flourishing	or	the	good	life.	
There	is	a	clear	connection	between	this	conception	of	ethics	in	terms	of	purpose	and	both	design	
and	systems.	Design	is	an	explicitly	purposeful	activity,	which	can	be	understood	as	the	attempt	to	
devise	“courses	of	action	aimed	at	changing	existing	situations	into	preferred	ones”	(Simon,	
1969/1996,	p.	111).	Purpose	is	of	central	concern	for	how	we	understand	systems,	most	explicitly	in	
cybernetics.	The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	make	explicit	some	of	the	deep	interconnections	between	
these	three	areas	in	terms	of	the	theme	of	purpose,	and	to	suggest	areas	of	common	concern	where	
they	might	lend	support	to	each	other.	
In	order	to	do	this	within	the	scope	of	this	paper,	I	focus	on	a	specific	point	of	reference	in	each	of	
the	three	areas:	to	Alasdair	MacIntyre’s	(1981/1985)	After	Virtue,	Dalibor	Vesely’s	(1985,	2004,	2010)	
account	of	architecture,	and	to	the	debate	around	Rosenblueth,	Wiener	and	Bigelow’s	(1943)	proto-
cybernetic	paper.	
The	failure	of	the	enlightenment	project	of	rationally	
justifying	morality	
MacIntyre	begins	After	Virtue	with	a	metaphoric	account	of	a	world	in	which	science	has	suffered	a	
cataclysm:	
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Imagine	that	the	natural	sciences	were	to	suffer	the	effects	of	a	catastrophe.	A	series	of	
environmental	disasters	are	blamed	by	the	general	public	on	the	scientists.	Widespread	riots	
occur,	laboritaries	are	burnt	down,	physicists	are	lynched,	books	and	instruments	are	
destroyed.	Finally	a	Know-Nothing	political	movement	takes	power	and	successfully	abolishes	
science	teaching	in	schools	and	universities,	imprisoning	and	executing	the	remaining	
scientists.	Later	still	there	is	a	reaction	against	this	destructive	movement	and	enlightened	
people	seek	to	revive	science,	although	they	have	largely	forgotten	what	it	was.	But	all	they	
posess	are	fragments:	a	knowledge	of	experiments	detached	from	any	knowledge	of	the	
theoretical	context	which	gave	them	significance;	parts	of	theories	unrelated	either	to	the	
other	bits	and	pieces	of	theory	which	they	possess	or	to	experiment;	instruments	whose	use	
has	been	forgotten;	half-chapters	from	books,	single	pages	from	articles…Adults	argue	with	
each	other	about	the	respective	merits	of	relativity	theory,	evolutionary	theory	and	phlogiston	
theory,	although	they	possess	only	a	very	partial	knowledge	of	each.	Children	learn	by	heart	
the	surviving	portions	of	the	periodic	table	and	recite	as	incantations	some	of	the	theorems	of	
Euclid.	
	 (MacIntyre,	1981/1985,	p.	1)	
According	to	MacIntyre,	something	like	this	has	happened	in	ethics	over	the	last	centuries.	The	
enlightenment	attempt	to	provide	a	rational	basis	for	morality	has	resulted	in	the	bifurcation	of	the	
social	world	into	the	realm	of	organization,	in	which	ends	are	taken	as	given	and	not	available	for	
scrutiny,	and	the	realm	of	the	personal,	in	which	debates	over	values	are	central	but	there	is	no	
available	social	resolution.	We	have	fragments	of	theories	but	these	are	drawn	from	different	
cultures	and	there	is	no	coherence	as	to	how	they	relate.	Debates	remain	unresolvable	and	our	
moral	reasoning	tends	to	take	the	form	of	assertion	and	counter	assertion.	
For	MacIntyre,	the	failure	of	the	enlightenment	project	to	rationally	justify	morality	was	inevitable,	
not	because	ethics	necessarily	involves	arbitrariness	but	because	of	the	specific	culture	in	which	this	
project	was	carried	out,	and	its	conception	of	what	would	count	as	rational.	This	involved	both	the	
adoption	of	scientific	forms	of	language,	which	were	descriptive	and	excluded	notions	of	purpose,	
and	the	simultaneous	fragmentation	of	religious	and	scholastic	traditions.	
This	process	has	left	us	with	an	incomplete	moral	scheme.	We	have	an	analysis	of	ourselves	as	we	
are	now,	and	various	moral	precepts	and	rules,	but	without	any	idea	of	our	goal	or	telos—
eudemonia,	the	good	life,	or	human	flourishing.	
Architecture	and	the	end	of	the	cosmological	tradition	
There	are	parallels	between	the	enlightenment’s	legacy	in	ethics,	as	described	by	MacIntyre,	and	its	
affect	on	the	design	discipline	of	architecture,	as	described	by	Dalibor	Vesely.	The	enlightenment	saw	
the	dissiptation	of	architecture’s	cosmological	tradition,	and	attempts	to	design	architecture	
rationally	in	various	ways,	such	as	the	use	of	history	as	a	reference	point:	
The	transformation	of	cosmological	into	astronomical	thinking,	where	the	unity	of	celestial	
and	terrestrial	phenomena	was	reduced	to	a	narrow	domain	of	celestial	mechanics	
(astrophysics),	lost	its	ability	to	serve	as	a	reference	for	the	phenomena	on	earth,	where	
architecture	itself	is	situated.	The	loss	of	cosmological	reference	was	gradually	replaced	by	
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reference	to	history,	focused	primarily	on	the	question	of	origins	(from	Solomon’s	temple	to	
the	primitive	hut).	The	foundational	role	of	classical	orders	was	replaced	by	historical	
precedents,	genealogies,	character	and	finally	by	style.	(Fischer	von	Erlach,	Boffrand,	J.F.	
Blondel,	et	al.)	The	reference	to	history	was	inevitably	more	relative	than	cosmology.	This	led	
to	the	well	known	historical	arbitrariness	of	the	19c	and	as	a	result	to	a	search	for	a	new	
objectivity	of	architectural	principles	and	order.	
	 (Vesely,	2010,	p.	4)	
Vesely	describes	this	as	leading	to	what	he	characterizes	as	our	“age	of	divided	representation”	
(Vesely,	2004),	a	split	between	technical	rationality	on	the	one	hand	and	personal	visions	on	the	
other,	much	as	in	MacIntyre’s	account.		
This	split	between	the	rational/	objective	and	the	aesthetic/	subjective	runs	deep	in	our	culture.	Yet,	
as	Vesely	points	out,	these	two	poles	are	not	in	opposition,	as	we	often	assume,	but	part	of	the	same	
problematic	settlement:	
Science,	technology	and	aesthetics	belong	together.	The	development	of	scientific	objectivity	
depends,	as	we	have	already	seen,	on	the	role	of	the	subject	responsible	for	the	project	of	
science.	In	other	words,	the	more	objective	reality	becomes,	the	more	subjective	must	be	the	
position	of	man,	because	in	modern	science	he	encounters	by	definition,	as	it	were,	only	his	
own	projection	of	reality.	In	conclusion,	it	is	possible	to	say	that	objectivity	in	science	is	in	fact	
the	product	of	the	subjectivity	of	man.	
	 (Vesely,	1985,	p.	26)	
Vesely	and	others,	such	as	Christian	Norberg-Schulz	(1971,	1980)	whose	name	is	on	the	door	of	the	
room	in	which	I	am	speaking,	have	attempted	to	heal	this	divide	using	phenomenology—to	recover	
an	understanding	of	the	cosmological	structure	of	space	in	a	way	that	is	accessible	in	the	present.	
This	position,	however,	has	been	in	retreat	in	recent	years	within	architectural	discourse.	
Cybernetics	and	the	reintroduction	of	purpose	into	scientific	
discourse	
MacIntyre	and	Vesely	describe	similar	historical	processes:	the	attempt	to	replace	traditional	forms	
of	enquiry	with	rational	justification;	the	failure	of	this	to	provide	a	stable	point	of	reference;	and	a	
resulting	split	between	the	rational	and	personal.	In	each	of	their	accounts	we	might	see	the	
development	of	modern	science	as	the	villain	of	the	piece,	with	its	rejection	of	final	causes	in	favour	
of	a	linear	and	mechanistic	account	of	causality.	It	was	this	linear	causality	that	risked	obfuscating	
what	was	special	about	design	in	the	design	methods	movement	(Gedenryd,	1998).	
Yet,	this	linear	causality	can	be	understood	as	also	limiting	the	scope	of	science.	It	is	in	conflict	with	
many	contemporary	developments,	such	as	the	study	of	complexity	or	emergence	and	the	
convergence	between	science	and	design	that	has	taken	place	in	recent	decades	(Jonas,	2014).	
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Cybernetics	is	notable	for	reintroducing	purpose	as	a	subject	within	scientific	discourse,	most	notably	
in	the	proto-cybernetic	paper	of	Arturo	Rosenblueth,	Norbert	Wiener	and	Julian	Bigelow	(1943).	
Heinz	von	Foerster	has	summarised	cybernetics	in	explicitly	Aristotelian	terms:	
…we	are	all	cyberneticians	(whether	or	not	we	call	ourselves	such)	whenever	we	justify	our	
actions	without	using	the	words	“because	of…,”or	“à	cause	de…,”	but	with	the	phrase	in	
English	“in	order	to…,”	which	in	French	is	much	more	Aristotelian,	“à	fin	de…”		
(von	Foerster,	1990/2003,	p.	298)	
Cybernetics	bypasses	problems	with	final	causes	occurring	after	the	events	they	cause	through	its	
circular	understanding	of	causality	(Stewart,	1959/2000)	and	emphasises	rather	than	hides	the	
agency	and	purposes	of	the	scientific	observer.		
Internal	and	external	goals	
As Rosenblueth et al. (1943) showed, the circularity of a cybernetic system allows a purpose to be 
pursued. Rosenblueth et al. defined purpose as follows: 
The	term	purposeful	is	meant	to	denote	that	the	act	or	behaviour	may	be	interpreted	as	
directed	to	the	attainment	of	a	goal—i.e.,	to	a	final	condition	in	which	the	behaving	object	
reaches	a	definite	correlation	in	time	or	in	space	with	respect	to	another	object	or	event.	
(Rosenblueth, et al., 1943, p. 18) 
The eponymous example of cybernetics is steering a ship, a clearly goal directed activity. The goal, 
however, is not necessarily best understood as the port towards which the ship is heading. As Richard 
Taylor (1950) argues, Rosenblueth et al.’s conception of purpose as striving towards a definite final 
condition does not account for vague or unsuccessful activities that are still goal-directed although no 
goal exists, such as “a man groping about in the dark for matches which are not there, but which he 
erroneously believes to be near at hand” or how “the alchemist can seek the philosopher’s stone, the 
knight can seek the Holy Grail” (p. 329).  
In these cases, and also in the case of the ship, we do not have to identify the goal of the system in 
terms of something external to it, such as the port. We can instead understand the goal as an internal 
quality of the system, that of being on course for the port—as a set of relations between steersman, 
sea, rudder and the direction in which the port is believed to lie.  
This removes the problem of the end goal being ambiguous, unknown or absent, such as in the 
examples Taylor cites. It also removes the risk that cybernetics’ understanding of teleology is 
interpreted in a deterministic way—the maintenance of the internal goal of being on course allows the 
steersman not just to continue his or her journey to a port but also to change course and to explore as 
yet unknown destinations. This is the sense in which Gordon Pask speaks of machines with 
“underspecified goals” (Bateson, 1972/2005); in which design is a cybernetic activity, oriented towards 
the new (Glanville, 2007; Sweeting, 2016a); and in which Andrew Pickering (2010) characterises 
cybernetics as a form of forward looking search. It follows that homeostasis, the process of 
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maintaining a goal state, does not necessarily imply the status quo. The maintenance of the internal 
goals of a system is a requirement for it being able to change its external goals. 
Internal	goals	(or	goods)	are	central	to	the	positive	part	of	MacIntyre’s	account,	where	he	tries	to	
recover	something	of	the	Aristotelian	conception	of	ethics:	
Consider	the	example	of	a	highly	intelligent	seven-year-old	child	whom	I	wish	to	teach	to	play	
chess,	although	the	child	has	no	particular	desire	to	learn	the	game.	The	child	does	however	
have	a	very	strong	desire	for	candy	and	little	chance	of	obtaining	it.	I	therefore	tell	the	child	
that	if	the	child	will	play	chess	with	me	once	a	week	I	will	give	the	child	50	cents	worth	of	
candy;	moreover	I	tell	the	child	that	will	always	play	in	such	a	way	that	it	will	be	difficult,	but	
not	impossible,	for	the	child	to	win	and	that,	if	the	child	wins,	the	child	will	receive	an	extra	50	
cents	worth	of	candy.	Thus	motivated	the	child	plays	and	plays	to	win.	Notice	however	that,	
so	long	as	it	is	the	candy	alone	which	provides	the	child	with	a	good	reason	for	playing	chess,	
the	child	has	no	reason	not	to	cheat	and	every	reason	to	cheat,	provided	he	or	she	can	do	so	
successfully.	But,	so	we	may	hope,	there	will	come	a	time	when	the	child	will	find	in	those	
goods	specific	to	chess,	in	the	achievement	of	a	certain	highly	particular	kind	of	analytical	
skill,	strategic	imagination	and	competitive	intensity,	a	new	set	of	reasons,	reasons	now	not	
just	for	winning	on	a	particular	occasion,	but	for	trying	to	excel	in	whatever	way	the	game	of	
chess	demands.	
	 (MacIntyre,	1981/1985,	p.	188)	
The	contrast	between	external	and	internal	goods	is	not	an	either/	or	choice,	and	external	goods	can	
follow	from	the	pursuit	of	internal	ones.	However,	it	is	a	problem	when	external	goals	dominate	
internal	ones.	If	our	actions	are	motivated	only	by	goods	external	to	them,	potentially	any	means	can	
be	justified.	This	includes	such	obvious	external	goals	as	wealth,	success	or	fame	but	also	apparently	
benevolent	goals	where	these	are	seen	as	external	to	the	practice	of	seeking	them,	such	as	in	
consequentialist	ethical	frameworks.		
MacIntyre’s	(1981/1985)	project	is	to	reconstruct	the	idea	of	the	good	life	or	human	flourishing	as	a	
goal	internal	to	our	lives,	drawing	on	social	roles	and	practices	that	have	internal	goods.	He	describes	
the	good	life	as	a	form	of	“quest”	(p.	219)	and	goes	on	to	define	it	self-referentially:	“the	good	life	for	
man	is	the	life	spent	in	seeking	the	good	life	for	man”(p.	219).	
The	pursuit	of	internal	goals	is	also	central	to	design.	Staying	with	the	example	of	architecture,	there	
is	a	significant	difference	between	those	buildings	that	have	been	designed	and	constructed	with	
care	for	their	qualities	as	pieces	of	architecture,	such	as	their	spatiality	or	craftsmanship,	and	those	
that	have	been	built	with	a	focus	on	external	goals,	such	as	profit.	Moreover,	designers	cannot	simply	
pursue	fixed	external	goals	when	they	are	designing	because	they	cannot	exhaustively	analyse	the	
situation	at	the	outset	(Rittel	&	Webber,	1973).	Rather,	designers	nurture	the	internal	goals	of	design	
activity,	revising	the	criteria	and	goals	of	the	project	as	they	do	so.	In	this	they	are	much	like	the	
steersman,	adjusting	his	or	her	course	to	suit	changes	in	the	environment	or	to	explore	new	
possibilities	not	seen	at	the	start	of	the	journey.	
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Conclusion	
Cybernetics,	design	and	virtue	ethics	are	each	concerned	with	similar	questions	regarding	purpose	
and	the	relation	of	goals	to	the	actions	that	pursue	them.	If	we	hold	with	the	historical	account	I	have	
sketched,	drawing	on	MacIntyre	and	Vesely,	then	we	might	even	say	they	are	concerned	with	the	
same	questions.	
There	are	several	ways	in	which	these	areas	might	usefully	support	or	critique	each	other.	For	
instance:	
• MacIntyre's	discussion	of	social	practices,	which	is	a	central	but	underdeveloped	part	of	his	
(1981/1985)	account,	may	benefit	from	cybernetic	discussions	of	internal	and	external	goals	
(Sweeting,	2015).		
• Although	he	does	not	frame	it	in	these	terms,	Ranulph	Glanville’s	(2004)	account	of	
cybernetics	and	ethics	takes	the	form	of	a	series	of	virtues	that	enable	and	cultivate	
cybernetic	forms	of	practice,	such	as	design.		
• MacIntyre’s	(1981/1985)	self-referential	definition	of	the	good	life	may	find	support	in	
cybernetic	understanding	of	circularity,	recursion	and	reflexivity	and	in	the	ethical	reflections	
of	second-order	cybernetics,	where	cybernetics	is	applied	to	itself	(e.g.	Glanville,	2004;	
Mead,	1968;	Poerksen,	2011;	Sweeting,	2016b;	von	Foerster,	1990/2003).	
• Virtue	ethics	seems	compatible	with	design	(Jonas,	2006)	in	a	way	that	consequentialism	and	
deontology	are	not,	given	their	dependence	on	forms	of	reasoning	(such	as	predefined	rules	
and	optimisation)	that	clash	with	what	is	special	about	design.	Cybernetics	may	be	one	way	
to	develop	this	connection.	
Developing	these	points	of	connection	can	help	us	understand	how	flourishing	may	be	put	forward	
as	a	goal,	as	has	been	proposed	by	many	participants	during	this	conference.	For	instance,	whenever	
we	speak	about	flourishing	we	must	take	care	that	we	do	not	advocate	it	merely	as	an	external	
goal—as	something	to	be	maximized	by	whatever	means	available.	
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